PROGRESS OF THE LAW.
As

MARKED BY

DECISIONS SELECTED FROM THE ADVANCE
REPORTS.

ANIMALS.

The rights of the owner of property in the case of trespassing animals are presented in Cobb v. Sater, 38 S. E. 1I14. The
Trespassing
Dog,

Poison

court below had held that a person has a right to

put poison on his premises for the protection of
his property, having due regard for the safety of

human life, and will not be liable for damages to one whose
dog eats the poison while trespassing. But if he places the
poison, not to protect his property, but with intent to kill the
dog, then he will be liable. On appeal the Supreme Court of
South Carolina was evenly divided, and in consequence the
judgment of the lower court was affirmed.
ASSAULT AND BATTERY.

Without citing any authority whatever in support of its
conclusion, the Supreme Court of Louisiana holds, in Solanas
Action for
Damages,
Condonation

V. Lupin, 29

Southern, 309, that where in an action

for damages for injuries resulting from an assault

committed by a woman upon a man who had been
her paramour, and who, while occupying that relation, had
eloped with her minor daughter, it appears that he afterward
induced her to assume upon occasions her former relations
with him, assuring her that his suit for damages would be dismissed, the offence committed by the woman will be held to
have been condoned in so far as concerns such action and the
same will be dismissed. It seems hard to support the decision
on principle, for when once the man's cause of action is complete, a contract to release it would have to be founded on
legal consideration, and the only consideration that could be
shown in this case was an illegal one, being the resumption of
illicit relations.
BANKRUPTCY.

The rule in Pennsylvania that where a judgment bond is

secured by a mortgage the lien of the judgment, when entered,
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BANKRUPTCY (Continued).

-, is carried back for certain purposes to the date of
the recording of the mortgage, is well established.
FictitiousDate But the United States District Court (Eastern DisLien

,o

Judgment,

trict, Pennsylvania) holds, in In re Engle, io5 Fed. 893, that
such fictitious date will not be assigned to it under the bankruptcy law, where the judgment is entered after the proceeding
in bankruptcy.
In Montana a woman may sue in her own name for her
seduction. It is held in Zn re Maples, io5 Fed. 919, that a
judgment so recorded by her is one for a "willful
Debts
Releaed by

Discharge

and malicious injury to the person" within the
meaning of the Bankrupt Act, 1898, § 17, a, subd.

2, from which the defendant cannot be released by a discharge
in bankruptcy. Whether or not the defendant has actual ill
will toward the plaintiff at the time of the injury, the court
regards the consequences as of such a character as to constitute his act toward her malicious in the eye of the law.
CARRIERS.

The Supreme Court of Alabama, in Tallassee Falls Manufacturing Co. v. Western Railway Co. of Alabama, 29 SouthContract,
Bill of
Lading

ern, 203, holds that notwithstanding a bill of lading
provides that a railroad company shall not be

liable as a common carrier after the freight has
reached its destination, public policy so modifies such a contract as to give the consignee a reasonable time within which
to remove the goods after arrival before such liability ceases.
On the other hand, the court refuses to allow proof of a custom to grant more than a reasonable time for the removal of
the goods, since to allow this would be to vary the express
terms of the contract.
A. purchased a ticket over a railroad for the sole purpose of
checking his trunk. He did not intend to go on the train and
Loss of
Baggage,
Liabiity

did not go, but went by his own private conveyance. His trunk arrived ahead of him and was
put in the baggage room, from which it was stolen.

Under these facts the Supreme Court of Michigan holds that
A. was not a bonafide passenger, and that the carrier was not
an ordinary warehouseman, bound to the exercise of that care
which the average man takes of his own property, but was a
gratuitous bailee, liable only for gross negligence: Marshall
v. Pontiac,etc., Railway Co., 85 N. W. 242. "It is implied in
the contract that the baggage and the passenger go together."
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

Imposing a heavier punishment upon a person conVicted of
a felony, if he has twice before been convicted of a crime for
Expostpacto which he has been sentenced to imprisonment for
Laws, Habit- not less than three years, does not impose any
uai Criminals additional punishdhAnt fo± the fohme- crimes, and
is therefore not a violation of the constitutional provision
against ex post facto laws : McDonald v. Massachusetts, 21
S. C. Reporter, 389.
The rule that the regulation of rates by the state legislatures
is limited to the extent that the rates fixed must not be such
Taking Prop. as to compel the railroad to conduct its operations
erty Without at a loss or without a fair remuneration for its
Due Process investment, has been well established. But in its
of Law
application many difficulties have still to be met in
deciding what is a "fair remuneration for its investment." In
Mlatthezvs v. Board of Corlorat'on Commissioners of North
Carolina,io6 Fed. 7,the United States Circuit Court (Easterh
District, North Carolina) holds that in estimating the returns
which are reasonable from the property invested, such property must be estimated at its present valile; and its cost, past
or probable future, or the cost to duplicate it are immaterial.
The New York Labor Law of 1897, amended in 1899, provided that laborers on public works should be paid the prevailing rate of wages; that contracts for such work
NewYork
Labor
should stipulate that they should be void unless
Law
complying with the act, and that the contractor
should not be entitled to receive any sum, and no public officer
should pay the same, for work done on a contract which, in
form or manner of performance, should violate the statutory
requisites of such contracts. In Peoplev. Coler, 59 N. E. 716,
the Court of Appeals of the State holds the act unconstitutional on the ground that it takes away the liberty of freely
contracting both from municipalities and those contracting
therewith, and deprives persons of property without due process of law. "With respect to property and contract rights
of exclusively local concern," says the court, "the state has
no right to interfere and control by compulsory legislation the
action of municipal corporations." Two justices dissent. The
principal dissent is by Chief Justice Parker, who takes the
position that the court has assumed more of a legislative than
a judicial attitude toward the act, and has been swayed in its
decision by questions of policy.
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CONTRACTS.

In Brown v. Dobson, 48 Atl. 415, the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania holds that where the defendant agreed within a
Option as to year to pay the plaintiffs a certain sum in cash or
Payment in stock, at his option, he, by failing to make payment or tender within the year, loses his right to exercise the
option.
The rule that a loan stipulating for payment in gold cannot
be extinguished by a tender of anything else is well known.
This appears in modified form in the case of CasMortgage,
Payment
ton v. Quimby, 59 N. E. 653, where the plaintiffs
In Gold
had been employed to procure a mortgage on
defendant's premises, and they claimed to have fulfilled their
contract by procuring a man who was willing to loan, provided
there should be a stipulation for the payment of principal and
interest in gold. The defendant contended that this was not
a fulfillment of their contract and the Supreme Judicial Court
of Massachusetts upheld his contention. The court seems to
think the defendant rather unreasonable, but says this is immaterial, since he had a right to insist on a mortgagee who would
not demand payment in anything but money, and hence he is
liable to pay no commissions to the plaintiffs.
In Welch v. Walsh, 59 N. E. 44o, the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts holds that in an action against a guarantor of rent, the fact that the landlord did not
Guaranty,
Default by make demand on the guarantor for more than
Principal
fourteen months, and that the guarantor had suffered from not knowing that the rent was not paid, constitutes
no defence. The guarantor's obligation is to pay a definite
sum at a definite time, and he must see that that sum is paid,
and there is no duty on the creditor to give notice to the
guarantor of a default in payment by the principal debtor.
CORPORATIONS.

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in construing the Colorado statute imposing an additional liability upon shareholders, making them in certain corporations
Additional
Liability of "individually responsible for debts, contracts and
Stockholders, engagements of said association," etc., holds that
Parties
an action against a single stockholder to enforce
this statutory liability cannot be maintained by a creditor, but
such action must be by or for all the creditors; and the corporation and the shareholders should be made parties: Bates
v. Day, 48 At. 407. This, the court says, is in line with the
"trend of judicial opinion."
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CORPORATIONS-(Continued).

In Lange v. Burke, 6I S. W. 165, it appeared that two men
owned the majority of the stock of each of two corporations,
one man being the president of both, but the corinsolvency,
Preferences porations were organized in different statesandfor
different purposes, though there were accolint§ betweew them.
These were kept as accounts with other parties, and, on the
insolvency of both, the Supreme Court of Arkansas holds
that they should be considered as separate corporations, and
the payment of the claim of the creditor corporation should
not be postponed until after the other creditors of the debtor
corporation are paid.
Where a creditor has been enjoined from suing a debtor
corporation, it is no objection to an action by him, in behalf
of himself, and other creditors who may join,
Judgment
against the directors thereof to enforce their statuAgainst
Corporation tory liability, that he had not obtained judgment
first against the corporation: Whitney v. Pugli, 68 N. Y. Supp.
992.
DAMAGE.

In an action against a common carrier to recover for damage done to oil portraits of the parents of the plaintiff's husband, the Supreme Court of Mississippi holds that
Family
Portraits plaintiff's evidence as to the worth of the pictures
to her from association and the fact of their being family portraits is improperly admitted, though such articles have no
market value; the true measure of recovery, it is said, is their
monetary value to the owner, taking into account the cost
and practicability of replacing them: Louisville & N. R. Co. v.
Stewart, 29 Southern, 394.
DEEDS.

In Carry.Maltby, 59 N. E. 291, the plaintiff had been
induced by fraud to convey her land in consideration of an
Fraud, Notice, agreement, the rentals and profits of the premises,
Possession and for her support, but she remained in posession.
Her grantee mortgaged to the defendant. The Court
of Appeals of New York holds that she cannot avoid her
deed, as against the defendant, since he innocently took
a mortgage thereon for seven years, relying on her deed, and
since her possession imputed notice to him of such facts only
as he would have learned on inquiry of her; and she could
not have disclosed the fraud, as she did not then know it, or if
she did know it would be estopped by her negligence. Three
judges dissent, holding that the mortgagee takes subject to the
rights of the person notoriously in possession.
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DVSCENT AND DISTRIBUTION.

The modern tendency to get away from the old discriminations of the common law against the half blood appears in
the construction of the portion of the California
Kndred
of the
Code dealing with their capacity to inherit. The
Halt Blood
statute, not unlike those of many states, provides
that "kindred of the half blood inherit equally with those of
the whole blood in the same degree, unless the inheritance
comes to the intestate by descent, devise, or gift of some one
of his ancestors, in which case all those who are not of the
blood of such ancestor must be excluded from such inheritance." Nevertheless, the Supreme Court of the state holds in
In re Smith's Estate, 63 Pac. 729, that in the excepted case
thereunder the kindred of the half blood were not absolutely
excluded from inheriting, but merely-postponed to those of
the whole blood, and that the provision had no application
between kindred in different degrees.
DIVORCE.

The reluctance of courts to grant a divorce'on the ground
of cruelty appears again in the case of Maddox v. Maddox,
59 N. E. 599. There the husband, though an
Cruelty
able-bodied man and well able to do otherwise,
cruelly and heartlessly neglected his wife, failing to provide
her with suitable shelter, clothing and food, but the Supreme
Court of Illinois holds that this is not sufficient cruelty to
justify a divorce. "There must be acts or threats which may
raise a reasonable apprehension of bodily hurt. The causes
must be grave and weighty, and show a state of personal
danger incompatible with the duties of married life."
MSCHEAT.

Real estate was conveyed to A. in trust to pay the rents to
a married woman during her life, and after her death to her
appointees by will. The wife died before her husTrusts
band, and by her-will directed the trustee to hold
the property in trust for her husband during his life, and after
his death for such persons as would have taken it had she
survived her husband and died intestate. On the death of the
husband it appeared that she had no next of kin. Under these
facts the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania holds in In re Linton's
Estate,48 Atl. 298, that since trust estates may now escheat, the
trustee holds for the commonwealth, which was entitled in
preference to the husband's heirs. Two justices dissent, without assigning any reason.
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EVIDENCE.

A strange change of mind on the part of both parties to a
suit as to a certain document gives rise to the ruling in Lewis
v. Healey, 48 Atl. 212. The case was an action
Error
Cured
for services rendered, and certain books were
offered in evidence by the defendant; plaintiff objected, and
they were excluded. Later these same books were offered by
the plaintiff, then the defendant objected. The court admitted
the books. On appeal the Supreme Court of Errors of
Connecticut holds this correct; that if there was any error in
excluding the books in the first place when offered by the
defendant, it was cured by their later admission, and after that
defendant could not claim to have been harmed.
In Com. v. Fry, 48 Atl. 257, a challenge for bias was made
by the defendant, but disallowed by the court. The Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania holds that this cannot be
Challenge
of Juror treated as reversible error where the defendant
did not exhaust all his peremptory challenges,
for Cause
since no harm could have been done to him, as he himself
could have corrected the court's error, if any, without any
detriment to himself. This principle is somewhat extended in
State v. Breauz, 29 Southern, 222, where the Supreme Court
of Louisiana holds that, where several defendants are tried
together, if any one has any peremptory challenges left, the
refusal of the trial judge to allow a challenge for cause is not
reversible error.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland, interpreting the statutes
of that state in reference to married women, and following the
Alienation of trend of modern authority, holds in Wolf v. Frank,
Husband's 48 Atl. 132, that the wife may maintain an action
Affections,
for the alienation of her husband's affections; and
Damages
in the view of the court even though the alienation
occurred prior to the passage of the statute. In this case the
defendant sought to show the unfaithfulness of the wife. This
was refused in the lower court, but on appeal it was held
material, not as extinguishing plaintiff's right of action-unless
it shall appear that that was the cause of the husband's
estrangement-but on the ground that it affected the measure
of damages, inasmuch as "no woman who permitted another
man to have improper relations with her could have the desire
for the society and affection of her husband that the law
assumes exists between husband and wife when it authorizes
a suit for the unlawful interference with those conjugal rights,
and a jury would not likely allow such a woman the same
amount of damages as would be awarded to a plaintiff free
from fault."
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EVIDENCE (Continued).

The Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia, admitting that
in civil cases where the witness is since dead, what he swore on
Evidenceof a a former trial may be given in evidence, holds in
D
ad
Montgomery v. Comm., 37 S. E. 841, that this rule
Witness
has never been allowed in criminal cases and
refuses to admit the testimony of one who had testified on a
former trial and was since dead, though the evidence was
offered for the defendant.
In Porter v. Commonwealth, 6i S. W. !6, the Court of
Appeals of Kentucky holds that the confession of an alleged
confessonof accomplice, implicating the accused, made in his
Accomplice I presence when both were in the custody of an offiPresence of cer, is not admissible against the accused, although
Accused
he remain silent and later accept from the alleged
accomplice a part of the money they are charged with having
stolen. "If the defendant is in custody .
. at the time
the statement is made . . . his silence, if he makes no

answer, cannot be regarded as raising any inference against
him." This principle quoted with approval by the court, is
the basis of the decision.
It is held in Squire v. Press Publishing Co., 68 N. Y. Supp.
1028, that in a libel for publishing a picture alleged to be the

plaintiff as that of a woman married to one A., evidence of people's recognition of plaintiff's resemblance to the published picture was properly
excluded, since it was merely the expression of an opinion on
a question which was for the jury. Two out of the five
judges dissent, but without assigning reasons.
Libel,

Resemblance
of Picture

FORGERY.

With one judge dissenting, the Court of Appeals of Kentucky refuses to sustain a conviction for forgery, either under
Character of the common law or under the Kentucky statute
writing providing punishment for the person who should
Forged
forge "any writing whatever, whereby fraudulently
to obtain possession of or deprive another of any money or
property, or cause him to be injured in his estate or lawful
rights," where it appeared that the alleged forgery was a writing to which an imitation of a woman's name had been attached,
purporting to be an invitation to a man to come to her house:
Colson v. Comm., 6i S. W. 46. The writing, says the court,
must be apparently such as will deprive him of a "legal right."
And a "legal right" is said to be one which may be enforced
in a civil action.
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HOMICIDE.

The status of the crime of abortion in its relation to the
common law and modern statutory modifications is continually
presenting questions of interest where such crime
Abortion
results in the death of the woman upon whom it
is practiced. In Worthington v. State, 48 Aft. -3S, the Court
of Appeals of Maryland reviews the common law upon the
subject, and holds, contrary to some dicta of cases and text
writers which it cites, that at common law death resulting
from an abortion was manslaughter and not murder, unless
there is an intent to kill or to inflict grievous bodily injury.
This certainly seems in line with the general rule of the common law that the death must either be intended or occur in
the perpetration of a felony, abortion being merely a misdemeanor.

INSURANCE.

Against the dissent of three judges, the Court of Appeals of
New York holds in Skinner v. Norman, 59 N. E. 309, that
Indorsement where an agent, applying for insurance, stated
of
that he did not know whether the property was
Incumbrance incumbered or not, and the insurer agreed to
on Policy
inquire regarding it of the owner, but issued the
policy without making the inquiry, a failure to indorse a note
of an incumbrance on the policy did not invalidate it, though
the property was in fact mortgaged. "The defendant should
not be allowed to plead its ignorance of a fact as to which it
has agreed to obtain knowledge."
In Louis v. Connecticut Mtt. Life Insurance Co., 68 N. Y.
Supp. 683, the Supreme Court, Appellate Division, holds that
flattrlality of where an applicant for insurance is asked the
question whether there was any fact not stated in
Facts

his previous answers which the company ought to know, it is
left to his judgment to decide whether the fact asked for is
material, and though the fact may be material, a false answer
is not sufficient to avoid the policy, unless the materiality is
known to him. The court further holds that though it may
be a custom of insurance companies not to issue a policy to
one who has attempted suicide, this will not, as a matter of
law, be held a material fact. One judge, Judge Ingraham,
dissents.
The usual provision in a policy of accident insurance, insuring against death by accident, exempting the company from
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liability for death from "intentional " injury inflicted by the insured or by any other person, is
Injury
construed by the U. S. Circuit Court of Appeals
(Sixth Circuit), in Corley v. Travelers' Protective Association,
io5 Fed. 854, not to preclude recovery where the insured is
killed by an insane person. The ground is that such injury
is not " intentional" within the meaning of the contract, since
such person cannot form a rational intent.
Accident,

Intentlon;a

The Supreme Court of California holds in Schroeder v. Zmperial Insurance Co., 63 Pac. 1074, that where a fire policy
Foreclosure of provided that, unless otherwise indorsed thereon,
rlortgage, it should become void if with the knowledge of
Knowledge of the insured foreclosure proceedings should be comInsured
menced against the property covered by the policy,
the policy became void on the service of process in foreclosure and failure to secure the insurer's consent to the
increased risk, notwithstanding insured had no knowledge of
the proceedings commenced until such service of process. A
decision to the contrary is cited, but the court regards its holding as supported by the weight of authority.
NATIONAL BANKS.

The Supreme Court of the United States holds, in Robinson
v. Southern National Bank of New York, 21 S. C. Rep. 383,
pledgee . that a bank which receives as collateral security
Stockholder for a note the stock of a national bank, and on
default proceeds to sell the stock and bid it in, is not liable as
a stockholder in the national bank, where it never has a transfer of the shares made on the books of the national bank.
As between the pledgee, bank and the debtor, who claims that
the sale is invalid, the stock continues to be held merely as
collateral for his debt.
NAVIGABLE WATERS.

It is generally stated that the American rule as to navigability is, that a stream is navigable in law which is navigable
in fact. But in Walsh v. Hopkins, 48 Atl. 390, the
Test
Supreme Court of Rhode Island applies the test,
which seems settled in England, that navigability in law, i. e.,
whether the waters of a stream are public waters, depend on
whether the tide therein ebbs and flows; and where this is the
case the riparian owners have only such rights as they are
allowed along navigable streams, though the stream is not in
fact navigable.
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NEGLIGENCE.

In Currierv. Trustees of Dartmouth College, 105 Fed. 886,
the U. S. Circuit Court (D. New Hampshire) holds that a colLiability of lege, by reason of its eleemosynary nature and its
Colleges
relation to its students, is not liable for a personal
injury to a student caused by negligence of the superintendent
of college buildings in clearing land owned by the college
preliminary, and erecting thereon a heating plant for college
purposes. Recovery is accordingly denied to a student who
sustained personal injuries by the alleged careless throwing
down of a chimney by the superintendent of college buildings.
NUISANCE.

In an action for damages for maintaining a garbage field near
plaintiff's land, the Court of Appeals of Maryland holds good
a defence that the plaintiff sold the field to the
Estoppel,
Infunction defendant, knowing the use to which it was to be
put : Roland Park Co. of Baltimore City v. Hull, 48 At. 366.
The court proceeds on the ground that the plaintiff is equitably estopped from claiming damages at law, and consequently
refuses to grant an injunction against his bringing such action.
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT.

Where under his contract an agent was not required to pay
interest on general balances, the Supreme Court of PennsylIntereston vania holds him liable, nevertheless, for interest
where it appears that he made sales at prices
Balances
greater than reported by him, on the amount thus tortiously
retained: In re Horey's Estate, 48 At. 3 11. These moneys,
it is said, were held " outside of the relation of principal and
agent."
RAILROADS.

The Court of Civil Appeals of Texas, declaring that under
the law of Texas an action may be maintained for physical
Fright as a injuries occasioned by fright, sustains a suit to
Cause of
recover for the miscarriage of a woman alleged to
Action
be caused by fright due to defendant company's
negligence, under the following circumstances:. She was driving with her husband, and they had just about reached a railroad crossing when a train was discovered approaching, it
having given no previous signal. The husband thought the
safest plan was to urge his horses over the track. He got
across safely, but his wife was greatly frightened, with the
result above indicated: St. Louis S. W. Ry. Co. of Texas v.
Mitchell, 6o S. W. 891.
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STATUTE OV LIMITATIONS.

In Allen v. Leflore CO., 29 Southern, 161, a husband having
defaulted in his accounts as county treasurer, his wife was
Avodmdn, of induced to deed her land to the county by threats
Deed Dures, of the district attorney to prosecute him criminally. These threats were made when the grand jury were in
session and apparently were backed by a strong public sentiment. The Supreme Court of Mississippi holds this sufficient
duress to avoid the deed, and further, that the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the death of the husband,
the duress being regarded as continuing so long as he lived.
It might well be argued that the statute should begin to run
from the time when the prosecution is barred.
In Smith v. Herd, 6o S. W. 841, the Court of Appeals of
Kentucky holds valid a provision in a policy of insurance
Contract 1. limiting the time within which an action may be
Reference to brought to a period less than that fixed by the
Limitation statute of limitations. The principles upon which
the case proceeds are that the purpose of the statute is to encourage prompt enforcement of claims, and this is not contravened by a voluntary agreement like the present, and that the
insurers have a right to designate the terms upon which they
will be responsible for losses. The court claims to decide in
accord with the weight of authority; however, three judges
dissent.
A cause of action does not accrue upon a contract to
make provision for another by will until the death of
the obligor, and the statute of limitations does not
Contract
to rla e
run until that time: Story v. Story, 61 S. W. 279
Provision by (Ky.). The same case also holds that such a conWill
tract is not within the statute of frauds, as the
event upon which it depends may happen within a year.
STREET RAILROAD.

In Kiley v. Chicago City Ry. Co., 59 N. E. 794, it appeared
that the plaintiff had received from a street-car conductor a
Pasenger, wrong transfer slip, and when she boarded a car
RefusaltoPay on the connecting line she tendered this. The
Fare
conductor refused to take it, and she declined to
pay her fare. He then used reasonable force to eject her.
The Supreme Court of Illinois holds under these circumstances
that she cannot recover for the injuries sustained, since it was
her duty to leave the car peaceably and seek redress in the
courts. Many cases, it is admitted, hold to the contrary.
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TAXATION.

The questions as to the situs of intangible property for the
purposes of taxation seem better settled in regard to such
property when owned by natural persons than
Intangible
Property of when owned by corporations. The Court of Civil
Railroad
Appeals of Texas holds, in State v. Austin& N.
W. R. Co., that the county in which is owned the principal
office of a railway, which owned a road extending through
other counties, cannot collect a tax on the entire intangible
property of the road within the state, consisting of franchises,
good-will, etc., since the situs of such property is distributed
wherever its tangible property is located and its work done.
One judge dissents, citing numerous authorities as sustaining
his contention. Probably the greater uncertainty in regard to
the law on this subject as to artificial circumstances arises
from the preliminary difficulty of giving to the persona ficta
a local habitation.

TRUSTS.

In New York Life Ins. and Trust Co. v. Baker, 59 N. E. 257
it appeared that the plaintiff, a trustee, had rceived from its,
preservation predecessor in the trust certain United States
bonds, purchased at a premium. Some of these
of
TrustFund it sold at a less premium and all interest on the
fund was paid to the beneficiaries as it accrued. The will
creating the trust provided for a payment to A. for life and at
his death the principal over. Under these facts the Court of
Appeals of New York holds that, instead of paying all the
interest, the trustee should have retained so much thereof as
was necessary to offset the premium paid for the bonds, so as
to keep the fund intact, and that consequently he was liable to
the beneficiary. The same is held as to bonds purchased at a
premium and held until maturity. One judge dissents on the
ground that such bonds were authorized by the will, and testator must have intended whole income thereof for the life
tenant during his life.
In Brinton v. Martin,47 Atl. 841, a will devised a farm to
testator's son A., "this farm to be held by him for his own use
during his life; at his death the same to descend
Rule In
Shelley's case to his children, or in default of children to his
legal heirs." The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania holds that
A. takes the fee. Emphasis is laid on the use of the word
"descend."
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TRUSTS-(Continued).

It is held by the New York Supreme Court (Appellate Division, Fourth Department) in In re Fidelity Trust and Guaranty
Co., of Buffalo, 68 N. Y. Supp. 257, that where
Dligaton
evisees, personal property alone is devised to the heirs of
o
Heirs, "

a testator who dies intestate as to the bulk of his

estate, consisting of real and personal property, and the will
does not show that he has employed the term "heir" in its
technical sense, it will be presumed that he has used it to indicate next of kin, who succeed to personal property in case of
intestacy.
By a decision of three judges to two of the Supreme Court,
Appellate Division (N. Y.), in Everdellv. Hill,68 N. Y. Supp.
719, the following holding is declared: Nieces
oral
Agreement
alleged that their three aunts made an oral agreement that the one first dying should leave her property to the
other two, the one next dying should leave hers, including what
she received from the first, to the third, and this survivor should
leave all to the nieces. The two who died first substantially
complied with the agreement, but the survivor executed a will
not in pursuance of the agreement. The nieces are denied
the right to compel a specific performance by having it
declared that the trustee under the last will held in trust for
them. The dissent is based on the theory of the creation of
a trust by the original agreement, and hence the conclusion is
reached that the case cannot be affected by the third will, and
the nieces are not simply strangers to a contract made for
their benefit, but are cestuis que trustent.

TRUSTEES.

In In re Lafferty's Estate, 48 Atl. 301, it appeared that a
will provided for a certain trust, and that when the number of
Appointment trustees should be reduced to two they should
petition the court to appoint another, and nominate
by Court
to it "such person as shall be a satisfactory colleague, to
be approved by the court for capability and good character."
The trustees nominated the son of the only trustee capable of
attending to the business. The court below refused to appoint
him on the ground that it would be contrary to good policy,
and that he was objectionable to a number of the cestuis que
trustent. On appeal to the Supreme Court of the State (Pennsylvania) the court was evenly divided, and consequently the
decision of the lower court was affirmed.
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WATERS AND WATER COURSES.

It will be remembered that the Court of Appeals of New
York recently held that an injunction might be maintained
against one who sank a well, so as to drain by
Artificlal
means of the underground streams the land of
Lake,
Yor,
-fYw.8 N. -,614.
vf.y
b.b
Percolations others:
A case somewhat the converse of this arose in Texas, where
A. built a dam on his land to a height higher than it had
previously been. This caused percolation through the ground
to ]3.'s land, and more than two acres of B.'s land became
marsh in consequence. In Texas & P. Ry. Co. v. O'Makoney,
6o S. W. 902, the Court of Civil Appeals holds A. liable to
B., and that, too, though there was no negligence in his
method of erection. These cases appear perfectly consistent,
and in line with the thought that with modern scientific knowledge the course of water underground must be treated much
the same as its course in surface channels.

